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Although employer pension programs vary in design, they are usually 
classified into two broad types: defined contribution and defined ben- 
efit. These two categories are distinguished in the law under ERISA. 
Under a defined contribution (DC) plan each employee has an account 
into which the employer and, if  it is a contributory plan, the employee 
make regular contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contri- 
butions and investment earnings of the accumulation in the account. 
Often the employee has some choice regarding the type of  assets in 
which  the accumulation  is invested and can easily  find out what its 
value  is  at any time.  Defined  contribution plans  are, in  effect, tax- 
deferred savings accounts in trust for the employees, and they are by 
definition  fully funded. They are therefore not  of  much concern to 
government regulators and are not covered by Pension Benefit Guar- 
antee Corporation (PBGC) insurance. 
In a defined benefit (DB) plan the employee’s pension benefit entitle- 
ment is determined by  a formula which  takes into account years of 
service for the employer and, in most cases, wages or salary. Many 
defined  benefit  formulas also take into account the  Social  Security 
benefits to which an employee is entitled. These are the so-called in- 
tegrated plans. See Merton, Bodie, and Marcus (1987) for a discussion 
of integration. 
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DB  and  DC plans  have  significantly  different  characteristics with 
respect to the risks faced by employers and employees, the sensitivity 
of benefits to inflation, the flexibility of funding, and the importance 
of governmental supervision. Our objective in this paper is to examine 
the trade-offs involved in the choice between DB and DC plans. 
In section 5.1, we briefly  review the mechanics governing the de- 
termination  and  valuation  of the benefit  streams under DB and DC 
pension plans. Section 5.2 contains an informal discussion of  the rel- 
ative advantages of each type of plan. In section 5.3 we develop a 
formal model to examine the trade-offs between the two types of plans 
in the face of both wage and interest rate uncertainty. Our conclusion 
is that neither plan can be said to wholly dominate the other from the 
perspective of employee welfare. Section 5.4  summarizes our results 
and concludes the paper. 
5.1  Plan Characteristics and Valuation 
5.1.1  Defined Contribution Plans 
The DC arrangement is the conceptually simpler retirement plan. 
The employer, and sometimes also the employee, make regular con- 
tributions into the employee's retirement account. The contributions 
are usually  specified as a predetermined fraction of salary, although 
that fraction need not be constant over the course of a career.' 
Contributions from both parties are tax-deductible,* and investment 
income accrues tax-free.  Often the employee is given a choice as to 
how his account is to be invested. In principle, contributions may be 
invested in any security, although in practice most plans limit invest- 
ment  options to various bond,  stock, and money-market funds. At 
retirement, the employee either receives a lump sum or an annuity, the 
size of which depends upon the accumulated value of the funds in the 
retirement account. The employee thus bears all of the investment risk; 
the retirement account is by definition fully funded, and the firm has 
no obligation beyond making its periodic contribution. 
Valuation  of  the DC  plan  is  straightforward: simply  measure the 
market value of the assets held in the retirement account. However, 
as a guide for personal financial planning, the DC plan sponsor often 
provides workers with the indicated size of a life annuity starting at 
retirement age that could be purchased now with the accumulation in 
their account under different scenarios. The actual size of the retire- 
ment annuity  will,  of  course, depend upon  the realized  investment 
performance of the retirement fund, the interest rate at retirement, and 
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5.1.2  Defined Benefit Plans 
Whereas the DC framework focuses on the value of the assets cur- 
rently endowing a retirement account, the DB plan focuses on theflow 
of benefits which the individual will receive upon retirement. 
A typical DB plan determines the employee’s benefit as a function 
of both years of service and wage history. As a representative plan, 
consider one in which the employee receives 1 percent of average salary 
(during the last 5 years of service) times the number of years of service. 
Normal  retirement age is 65, there are no early retirement options, 
death or disability  benefits, and no Social Security offset provisions. 
The actuarially expected life span at retirement is 80 years. 
Assuming the worker is fully vested, at any point in time his claim 
is a deferred nominal life annuity, insured up to certain limits by the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. It is a deferred annuity because 
the employee cannot start receiving benefits until he reaches age 65. 
It is  nominal because the retirement benefit,  which  the employer is 
contractually bound to pay the employee, is fixed in dollar amount at 
any point in time up to and including retirement age. 
Many people think that under final average pay plans  of the sort 
described here, retirement benefits are implicitly indexed to inflation, 
at least during the employee’s active years with the firm, and therefore 
should not be viewed as a purely nominal asset by the employee and 
a purely nominal liability by the firm. We  examine this issue in detail 
in section 5.2. For now we focus on the value of the explicit claim only. 
Given an interest rate and a wage profile,  it is  straightforward to 
compute the present value of accrued benefits under our prototype DB 
plan. Table 5.1 presents such values for workers at different ages as- 
suming a constant real annual wage of $15,000. The present value of 
accrued liabilities can increase from continued service because of  3 
factors: (1)  as years of service increase, so does the defined benefit, 
(2) if the wage increases, so will the retirement benefit, and (3)  as time 
passes, less time remains  until the retirement benefits begin,  SO that 
their present value increases at the rate of interest. 
To illustrate the separate contributions of each of these factors to 
the cumulative results reported in table 5.1, consider the case in which 
the benefit formula calls for 1 percent of final year’s salary times years 
of service and that the worker lives for 15 years after retiring at age 
65. The worker is 35 years old, has worked for the firm 10 years, and 
his current salary is $15,000. The nominal interest rate equals a real 
rate of 3 percent per year plus the expected rate of  inflation. 
Under the 7 percent inflation scenario, the sources of the change in 
the value of the pension benefit from the passage of an additional year 
are as follows. Prior to this year, the worker had accrued a life annuity Table 5.1  Present Value of  Accrued Benefits and Marginal Change in Benefits for Hypothetical Worker, No Early Retirement 
Present Value of 
Accrued Benefits 
in Constant Dollars 
0% Inflation  7% Inflation 
3% Discount  10% Discount 
Rate  Rate 
Starting Age 25 
Current Age 
Marginal Change in 
Present Value of 
Accrued Benefits from 
an Additional 
Year’s Work 
0%  Inflation  7% Inflation 
3% Discount  10% Discount 
Rate  Rate 
Constant  % of  Constant  % of 

























































NOTES:  Worker currently paid $15,000 per year with no real wage growth. 
Worker will retire at age 65. 
Pension plan pays  1 percent of  average salary in last 5 years times years of service. 
Pension plan contains no early retirement provisions or makes correct actuarial adjustment for early retirees. 
Benefits are vested after 5 years. 
Real interest rate is 3 percent, nominal rate increases one for one with inflation. 
*Value calculated for age 64 rather than age 65. 
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of $1,500 per year (1  percent  x  10  years  x  $15,000) beginning at age 
65. With a nominal interest rate of  10% per year, the present value 
(PV) of this deferred annuity at age 35 is $654. The increase in pension 
benefits as a result of working an additional year can be broken into 
three parts: 
Factor 1: One additional year of service at a salary of $16,050 ($15,000 
x  1.07) entitles him to an additional deferred annuity of 
$160.50 per year, and 
Factor 2: The salary increase of $1050 entitles him to an additional 
deferred annuity of $105 per year  (1 percent  x  10 years 
x  $1,050). 
The PV of these additional accrued benefits from factors 1 and 2 at the 
end of the year is $127. This represents the nominal value of the newly 
earned pension benefits, which is an annuity of $265.50 per year starting 
at retirement. 
Factor 3: The PV of his previously accrued benefits increases by  10 
percent  from  $654 to  $719.40 because  the date of  their 
eventual receipt has drawn one year closer. 
As a result of all three factors, the nominal value of his pension wealth 
increases from $654 to $846 and its real value to $791. 
Now let us refer to table 5.1 to see how these factors manifest them- 
selves in the time pattern of  benefit accrual in the no-inflation and in 
the 7 percent inflation scenarios. The right-hand panel shows the con- 
stant dollar present  value of benefits attributable to continued  work 
with the same employer; these benefits are represented by factors  I 
and 2 only. In the no-inflation case, there is no salary growth and hence 
only factor 1 is at work. For each additional year of service an additional 
deferred annuity of $150 per year is earned. Note, however, that the 
value of the incremental benefits earned at each age increases with age, 
from $455 (3.03 percent of salary) at age 30 to $1,242 (8.28 percent of 
salary) at age 64. This is a reflection of the fact that the additional $150 
per year deferred life annuity has a higher PV the closer the employee 
is to age 65. The accrual of benefits under a DB plan is thus inherently 
‘  ‘backloaded  .’ ’ 
For a fixed real interest rate, this backloading effect is much more 
pronounced in the 7 percent inflation scenario because of the impact 
of inflation on the nominal interest rate. In this case the constant-dollar 
value  of  additional  pension  benefits earned  increases  from  $41  (.27 
percent of salary) at age 30 to $2,794 (18.63 percent of  salary) at age 
64. In contrast, backloading or frontloading in DC plans is independent 
of inflation as well as interest rates3  This is because employers can 
achieve any backloading pattern  by  simply choosing an appropriate 
pattern of contribution rates over the course of the employee’s career. 
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PV of total accumulated pension benefits under the DB plan assuming 
no real salary growth. 
5.1.3  Funding 
As mentioned before, DC plans are by their nature fully funded, that 
is, the market value  of  the plan’s  assets equals the liability  of  the 
sponsor to the plan’s beneficiaries. In sharp contrast, the calculation 
of the funding status of DB plans is complex and controversial. If the 
plan’s  assets are invested in traded securities, their market value is 
relatively easy to ascertain. The source of difficulty is in measuring 
the sponsor’s liability. 
From a strictly legal point of view the sponsor’s liability is the present 
value of the accrued vested benefits which would be payable if the plan 
were immediately terminated. But many pension experts contend that 
sponsors have an implicit semicontractual obligation which makes it 
more appropriate to take account of projected future salary growth in 
the computation of  the firm’s pension liability. The contention of  a 
further obligation beyond the legal one makes it unclear whether a real 
or nominal interest rate should be used in discounting future benefits 
(either with  or without  salary  growth projections) to compute their 
present value. To evaluate the strict obligation of the sponsor, the DB 
liabilities could be determined by deriving the cost of an immunized 
or dedicated bond portfolio using current market prices. While clearly 
superior to a simple interest rate assumption, this valuation procedure 
is itself only an approximation because the payment dates of pension 
liabilities typically  extend far beyond the maturity range that is rich 
enough to extract our discount bond prices from traded coupon bonds. 
Hence, an exact bond-dedication scheme is not feasible. Immunization 
techniques that rely on duration measures are not wholly reliable be- 
cause duration measures are sensitive to  the specification of term struc- 
ture dynamics. (See Bierwag  1977, Bierwag and Kaufman 1977, and 
Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross 1979). Beyond the term structure, the default 
risk associated with partially funded pension obligations adds the fur- 
ther problem  of  choosing  equivalent-risk  bonds from the  securities 
market. 
For the past several years the Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB) has been grappling with these issues, trying to establish a uni- 
form  set of  valuation  standards for firms  to use in  their  financial 
statements. 
The government guarantees, up to a limit, employer pension benefits 
through the PBGC. The valuation of guaranteed benefits therefore should 
utilize the riskless-in-terms-of-default  interest rate. However, in prac- 
tice, only 80 percent of accrued benefits is vested while only 90-95 
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accrued benefits is not guaranteed (Amoroso 1982). Thus, the funding 
status of a plan is important to employees as well as to the PBGC. In 
effect, adequate funding protects accrued-but-not-yet-vested benefits. 
See Marcus (1987) for an analysis of  PBGC insurance and corporate 
funding policy. 
5.2  Trade-offs 
Our original belief was that defined contribution plans would nec- 
essarily dominate defined benefit plans because of the flexibility of DC 
plan design. We  would have guessed that anything that could be ac- 
complished with a DB plan could be replicated in a cleverly constructed 
DC plan. However, this belief is not borne out. DB plans create implicit 
securities that can be welfare improving and that are neither currently 
available in capital markets, nor likely to be created in capital markets 
in the future. Some examples of these “securities”  are factor-share 
claims, price-indexed claims, and perhaps deferred life annuities at fair 
interest rates. 
Moreover, some of the “real-world’ ’ complications in plan design, 
such as incentive effects, tend to favor DB over DC plans. Thus, the 
optimal plan design is likely to be firm specific. At this point, all we 
can do is  enumerate the relative  advantages of  each plan  type and 
describe the circumstances in which one plan might dominate. 
5.2.1  Investment Performance and Choice 
The most obvious source of risk to an employee in  the DC plan is 
the investment performance of the fund. However, this source of un- 
certainty can be controlled. For example, the periodic contributions 
of the DC plan could, in principle, be used to purchase deferred an- 
nuities  which  would  generate  retirement  income streams similar  to 
those provided by DB plans. Alternatively,  it is feasible for the plan 
to select an investment strategy with low variance rates of real returns. 
Bodie (1980) has shown that commodity futures can be added to port- 
folios  to  successfully  provide  an  effective  hedge  against  inflation. 
Therefore, in either nominal or real terms, DC plans do not necessarily 
impose substantial risk on participants, given the availability of  low- 
variance investment strategies. 
There are, however, no strong a priori reasons to believe that most 
individuals would choose to invest accumulated DC funds in the lowest 
risk asset. DC plans typically offer sufficient flexibility to select a risk- 
return strategy  suited  to the employee’s individual preferences  and 
circumstances. In contrast, DB plans force individuals to accumulate 
the pension portion of retirement saving in the form of deferred life 
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5.2.2  Accrual Patterns 
As noted and illustrated in table 5.  I, DB plans are inherently back- 
loaded. DC plans can be backloaded  too by choosing a contribution 
rate that rises with a worker’s age and ten~re.~  Therefore, the salient 
inherent difference in accrual patterns between the two plan designs 
is that DB backloading is stochastic in the sense that real benefit ac- 
cruals depend upon the rate of  wage  inflation. This seems to us an 
avoidable source of uncertainty which both parties (employer and em- 
ployee)  might  benefit  by  shedding. On this  score, DC plans  would 
appear to be superior,  although  implicit  contracting to provide  em- 
ployees with aprotective “wage floor” (cf. Diamond and Mirrlees 1985) 
can be implemented more effectively with DB-type plans. 
5.2.3  Termination and Portability 
It is commonly asserted that considerations of portability favor DC 
plans. The typical justification  is that the worker in a DB plan who 
leaves his job for reasons beyond his control forfeits future indexation 
of benefits already accrued. It is further asserted that there are implicit 
contracts between employees and firms which require larger total com- 
pensation (wage plus pension accrual)  for more highly tenured workers. 
Hence, termination of employment causes a forfeiture of the ability to 
work for advantageous total  compensation rates (and, in  particular, 
indexation of total pension accruals). Under this line of reasoning, DC 
plans are more portable. 
It should be realized, however, that the portability issue is intimately 
tied to the accrual pattern. For DC plans with contribution rates tied 
to tenure as well as age, the penalty  to early termination  can be as 
great as for any DB plan. In practice, however, contribution rates for 
DC plans are rarely tied to tenure and are usually not as heavily back- 
loaded as DB plans. Therefore, in  practice it would appear that port- 
ability considerations do favor DC plans over DB plans. 
5.2.4  Incentives 
Pension benefits in DC plans depend upon the wage trajectory over 
the worker’s entire career. In contrast, benefits in most DB plans de- 
pend  on final average  salary.  For this reason, workers in  DB plans 
should have a greater incentive to sustain a high level of effort over 
the entire career in  order to achieve a high  career-end salary. Final 
salary has greater leverage in DB plans because of its greater effect on 
pension benefits. 
In conclusion, it seems that there is a trade-off between the goals of 
portability and incentives. Portability dictates low backloading, while 
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for lower backloading than DB plans, this pattern is not an inherent 
property of the two plans. 
5.2.5  Informational Economies in Plan Design and Implementation 
Retirement income planning is one of  the most complex areas of 
personal finance. Many employees would consider it a service to have 
their employer define and provide an adequate level of savings for them. 
Since retirement-income goals are typically defined as percentage re- 
placement rates of salary, the benefits of DB plans which are defined 
in exactly those terms are easier to interpret. 
One could in principle achieve the goal of a specific replacement rate 
with a DC plan of the so-called target benefit type. Under these plans, 
the contribution rate is adjusted periodically to achieve the target re- 
placement rate, taking into account the discrepancy between actual 
and assumed investment return. However, such plans are rare. 
5.2.6  Wage-Path Risk 
The pegging of benefits in  DB plans to final average  wage would 
appear to provide employees with a type of income-maintenance in- 
surance not available in DC plans. This observation has been used to 
support the selection of these plans over DC plans. This conclusion 
is, however, not robust. If wage paths are unpredictable at the start of 
a career, then individuals may view it as very risky to have their re- 
tirement benefits depend so heavily on final salary. Indeed, employees 
might  prefer a retirement  benefit  tied  to (inflation-adjusted) career- 
average earnings so as to eliminate excessive dependence on the re- 
alized wage in the final years of employment. This time-averaging fea- 
ture is achieved by  a DC plan  because benefits will depend on the 
contribution in each year of service, rather than on a final wage formula. 
Although inflation-adjusted career-average DB plans would achieve the 
same goal, in practice these plans are quite rare. In fact, the only major 
DB plan that pays a benefit computed in such a fashion is the Social 
Security  system.  We  pursue  this  issue  further  in  the  analysis  in 
section 5.3. 
5.2.7  Interest-Rate Risk 
As noted earlier, one major source of uncertainty in DC plans con- 
cerns the terms under which  the stock of retirement wealth can be 
transformed into a flow of retirement income. DB plans, by offering 
life annuities, effectively guarantee the interest rate at retirement. It 
should be noted, however, that without indexation of benefits, this is 
a guarantee of the nominal rather than the real interest rate. The value 
to the employee of a nominal-rate guarantee is questionable when in- 
flation over a 10- or 20-year period can be highly unpredictable. 148  Zvi BodieIAlan J. MarcudRobert C. Merton 
In principle,  DC  plans  can offer  at retirement the same nominal 
interest rate guarantee through the purchase of deferred life annuities 
as a DB plan. However, in practice, with the notable exception of the 
Teacher’s Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), the capitaliza- 
tion rates used to compute benefits in the private annuity market are 
far below the interest rates available in competitive financial markets. 
This discrepancy is often attributed to an adverse selection problem 
and discourages participation  in  the annuity market by unhealthy in- 
dividual~.~  The adverse selection issue is largely avoided in DB plans 
because workers are precommitted to participation regardless of health 
status. 
5.3  A Model of Wage and Interest Rate Uncertainty 
In this section we develop a model to focus on the twin issues of 
wage and interest rate uncertainty using stylized versions of DB and 
DC plans. We find that the putative replacement rate advantages of DB 
plans are not supported by our model, and that the interest rate guar- 
antee is only partially supported: specifically, DB plans do offer welfare- 
improving opportunities with  respect to postretirement interest rate 
uncertainty, but not with respect to preretirement uncertainty. 
For the most part, we will concentrate on individual welfare  in  a 
model in  which all wage  uncertainty is employee-specific and, from 
the firm’s perspective, is perfectly diversifiable.  This framework is at 
a polar extreme from Merton’s (1983) model of Social Security, in which 
all uncertainty regarding marginal product derives from uncertainty in 
the aggregate production function, with no individual-specific  effects. 
In Merton’s framework, labor-income uncertainty is perfectly  corre- 
lated across individuals, and in such an environment, DB plans may 
offer superior risk-sharing properties that are not captured in our model. 
Although our model focuses exclusively on uncertainty at  the individual 
worker’s level and interest rate risk,  we will  discuss further the im- 
plications of Merton’s model for our results. As indicated earlier, in- 
terest rate uncertainty emerges as a central determinant of the relative 
advantages of DB versus DC plans. 
5.3.1  Pension Plan Design 
We  consider a 3-period model in which the individual works in pe- 
riods 0 and l  and is retired in period 2.  Current wage, W, is known, 
while period-1 wage, W,,  is uncertain until t  =  1. For simplicity, we 
will assume that the time 0 expectation of  W1 is  W,,.  Trends in wage 
paths could easily be incorporated into the analysis, but would simply 
clutter the algebra; hence we ignore such trends. Wages are measured 
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Consumption occurs at three points: t = 0, 1, 2. A pension benefit, 
P,  is paid at t = 2. The real interest rate prevailing between t = (0, 1) 
is denoted r,, and is known at time 0. The real rate between t  = (1, 2) 
is rl and is not known until time  1. Finally, we assume that individuals 
have  initial nonhuman wealth  of Ao. The timing assumptions of the 
model are presented in figure 5.1. 
If financial  markets were complete, then, of course, the choice of 
pension plan would be irrelevant because the employee could use se- 
curities to trade to an optimal position.  There are two important de- 
viations from complete markets that make pension design crucial from 
the employee’s perspective. First, there are neither markets in which 
wage uncertainty can be insured, nor ones in which claims to future 
wages can be sold.  This feature of  our model  precludes employee- 
initiated risk pooling. Second, because of adverse selection problems, 
the market for deferred life annuities is assumed to be closed. Although 
such markets do  in fact exist, as discussed, the rates of return typically 
offered are so low as to discourage widespread participation. In our 
model, the absence of such annuities will be captured by not allowing 
individuals to invest at t = 0 in two-period bonds which pay specified 
returns during the retirement period, t  = 2. 
The goal of the firm is to offer a pension plan that maximizes  the 
utility of a “typical” worker, subject to the constraint that all pension 
plans considered have equal present value of costs to the firm. Subject 
to the firm’s indifference condition, we compare the utility  value of 
DB versus DC plans. 
In DB plans, firms typically promise workers a prespecified fraction 
of career-end wages, possibly averaged over the last several years of 
working life,  and this is the type of plan we model. We  will assume 
that the pension benefit at t  = 2 equals W,,  so that expected income 
in each period of life is equal. We assume further that pension benefits 
are explicitly linked to the price level. While this practice is uncommon 
in the private sector in the United States, it is true of Social Security 
and it serves as a useful base case from which to analyze the potential 
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The present value at t  = 0 of the firm’s time-2 pension obligations 
is 
(1)  PVDB = E(Wl)B(O,  2), 
where B(0,  2) is the present value at t  = 0 of a claim to an expected 
payoff  of  $1  at t  = 2, with  an uncertainty equivalent to that of the 
wage distribution. If wage uncertainty were completely diversifiable, 
then B(0, 2)  would  equal the present value of a certain dollar to be 
received in two periods; B(t, T)  would be the discount function at t for 
payments at T.  However, for the moment, we will not restrict the nature 
of wage uncertainty. 
In  contrast to DB  plans, DC plans  require firms  to contribute a 
prespecified fraction of wages into the worker’s retirement saving ac- 
count each period.  For simplicity we will assume that explicit wages 
paid in each period are the same for each type of pension plan provided. 
Hence, the indifference condition for the firm is that the present value 
of periodic contributions into the DC plan equals the present value of 
the DB commitment. The prespecified (at t = 0) DC contribution sched- 
ule is set at time 0 and therefore can depend only on observed variables 
at t = 0. While the contribution rates may depend on expectations of 
future interest rates, they cannot be updated ex post facto to reflect 
realizations of interest rates or any other factor. 
There is an infinite number of DC contribution schedules which have 
the same PV. Among these, we will select the one which has the same 
timing pattern as the PV of  accruing benefits under the DB plan. 
The contribution schedule, k,, as a fraction of wages is given by: 
1 
k  -  -B(O, 2); 
O-2  (2)  t  = 0, 
t  =  I. 
1 
2 
kl  = -B(O, 2)/B(O, 1); 
The present value at I  = 0 of the DC plan contribution equals 
PVDC = koWo + klEo(Wl)B(O,  1) 
1  1 
2 
= -WOB(O,  2)  + ;E.(WI)B(O,  2). 
Since Eo(Wl)  = Wo,  the present values of the firm’s contributions in 
the DB and DC plans are equal. 
Notice that since B(0,  I) is less than I, the DC plan as specified above 
embodies some backloading. In fact, any degree of prespecified back- 
loading may be built into the DC plan simply by changing the coeffi- 
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kl and k2 that sums to 1 will ensure that the present value of the DC 
plan equals the present value of the DB plan. 
The pension  benefit in the DC plan will accumulate at t  = 2  to a 
value that depends on the investment experience of the plan. Call the 
rate of return on the pension portfolio in each period zf  and let 2, = 
1  + zr. Then the pension benefit paid at t = 2 in the DC plan will be 
(3) 
whereas in the DB plan, 
(4)  PDB = w,. 
Notice that there is no assurance, or even likelihood, that the expected 
pension benefits will be equal across the two plans, despite the fact 
that the ex ante present values are equal. 
5.3.2  Welfare Analysis 
Pension benefits are subject to uncertainty from both stochastic wage 
paths and stochastic investment returns. Rather than consider these 
effects jointly, we will examine polar cases in which one or the other 
source of uncertainty dominates. 
1  1 
2 
PDC = -B(O, 2)W,Z,Z,  + po,  2)/B(O,  1)W121, 
Wage Uncertainty 
Consider first the case in which all investment returns can be made 
certain by investing pension assets in  default-free  bonds. Therefore 
both r,,  and r1  are known at t = 0. Moreover, suppose for the moment, 
that all wage uncertainty is perfectly diversifiable to the firm, so that 
B(t, Z‘)  is simply the discount function for riskless future cash flows. 
Under these hypotheses, 
2, =  1  + r,  = R, and z1 = 1  + rI = RI. 
Further, with no uncertainty regarding the evolution of future interest 





PDC = -(W,, +  WJ. 
In this simple case, it is clear that the DC plan must dominate the DB 
plan for any risk-averse utility function. With E,(W,) = W,, both plans 
have equal expected benefits, while the DC plan imposes less uncer- 
tainty on participants because of  the “wage averaging”  embodied in 
equation (3’). Essentially the only uncertainty in this case derives from 
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through the firm (and ultimately the stock market), while the DB plan 
allows for none. This advantage of DC plans may be thought of as a 
pure efficiency gain. 
The advantage of DC plans in  the wage-uncertainty-only scenario 
does not hinge solely on the diversifiability of wage risk. Suppose that 
final wage is highly correlated with some marketable security, such as 
the value of the stock of the firm or the value of a broad market index. 
In this case, the DB plan implicitly forces the participant to invest a 
large fraction of wealth in this asset, since the pension benefit essen- 
tially duplicates the payoff to the asset. In contrast, the DC plan allows 
the participant to take the pension contribution each period and invest 
it in any security. In essence, the DC plan allows participants to get 
their money out of the (0ver)investment in  W,  and achieve superior 
portfolio diversification. This advantage of DC plans is incremental to 
the pure  efficiency gain from the  risk  pooling opportunity that was 
noted above. 
Interest Rate Uncertainty 
In this section, we will assume that wage paths are either given or 
uncorrelated with the interest rate, and that the only investment ve- 
hicles are bonds. However, the future path of interest rates is not known 
at the time the pension contract is established. Because wages pose 
no systematic risk, B(t,  T)  is simply the riskless discount function, and 
B(0, 1) = l/Ro. 
As in Merton (1983), we will assume that the lifetime utility function 
for the individual at time 0 is 
(5) 
At time 1, all uncertainty is resolved since both WI and Rl (and hence 
P)  are known. Lifetime utility at t = 1 is thus 
uo  = log (Co)  + E,[log(C,)  + log(C2)I. 
UI  = log(C,) + log(C2), 
u2  = log(C2). 
and at t  = 2 is 
Upon arriving at t = 2, the individual will consume all of his financial 
wealth, plus all pension benefits: 
(6)  C2  = (A, + Wl - CI)Rl + Z? 
Thus, at f  = 1, the optimization problem is 
max[log(C1) + log(C,)l, 
which results in the first-order condition 
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Using equation (6),  equation (7) can be solved to yield 
C,* = (Al + W1 + P/R1)/2, 
C,*  = RlCI*. 
Using the expressions for P from equations (3)  and (4), we find that 
(8-DB)  CPB = (A, + W,  + WI/R1)/2, 
while 
(8-DC)  Cpc  = [A, + W1  + (1/2)(WO + Wj)B(O,  2)RO]/2. 
As expected, the difference between equations (8-DC) and (8-DB) 
reflects the “wage diversification”  attribute of DC plans, in that con- 
sumption depends upon a weighted  sum of earnings over the entire 
career. A perhaps surprising feature of equations (8) is that consumption 
for individuals in DC plans is not a function of the realized  interest 
rate, R1,  although it is for individuals in DB plans. This is true despite 
the fact that retirement wealth is subject to interest rate risk for DC 
plans, but not for DB plans. 
This feature of the model turns out to be an artifact of the log utility 
function, but nevertheless highlights an important feature of DB versus 
DC plan design. Recall the first-order condition (7) for optimal con- 
sumption allocation across times  1 and 2, which requires that time-2 
consumption be R, times time-1 consumption. For an individual in a 
DC plan, all wealth already is held and can be invested at rate RI  at t 
= 1. Thus, the simple rule is to consume one-half of wealth at t = 1, 
invest the remainder, and thus consume RI  times one-half of wealth at 
t  = 2. Consumption at t  = 1 is thus independent of R,. In contrast, 
in a DB plan, the pension benefit to be received at t  = 2 already is 
fixed at t = 1. Thus, a large value of R1  requires a decrease in t = 1 
consumption in order to satisfy the first-order condition for an optimum. 
Another way of seeing this is to note that, for the log utility function, 
consumption at t = 1 depends only on wealth, not on the interest rate. 
For DC plans, wealth at t  =  1 is independent of R,, since all assets 
are already in hand. For DB plans, pension benefits are still deferred 
at t =  1, and wealth depends on R,. 
For more general utility functions, consumption at t  =  1  depends 
on both wealth and R,. However, DC plans still offer a type of con- 
sumption smoothing that is not offered by DB plans. Specifically, the 
generalized first-order condition at t =  1 requires that the ratio of the 
marginal utility of consumption at t =  1  to that at t = 2 equals RI.  A 
larger R, thus induces more time-2 consumption. This can be attained 
with  less (or no)  sacrifice of  current  consumption when  assets  are 
already in hand since assets currently invested can earn the higher rate 
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and substitution  effects.  A  larger R, decreases pension wealth  and, 
simultaneously, requires a reallocation  of consumption to the retire- 
ment period, t = 2. Thus, the consumption stream in DC plans is less 
sensitive to the interest rate during the accumulation phase, and indeed, 
in the log utility case, is actually independent of the realization of the 
interest rate. 
Using equations (S), we may now compute the derived or indirect 
utility function at t = 1: 
(9-DB)  JDB(A1,  Wl,  t  = 1) = lOg(C,*) + lOg(C,*) 
= 2 log[l/2(A1 +  W1 + Wl/Rl)] 
+ log(R1); 
(9-DC)  JDc(A1, W1, t  = 1) = 2 10g{l/2[A, + W1  + W’B(0,  2)RJ) 
+ log(R,); 
where W‘  = (W, + WJ2,  that is, career-average earnings. 
As a base case to compare equations (9), consider the situation in 
which the expectations hypothesis for the term structure of interest 
rates holds. ThenB(0, 2) = (l/Z?,)Eo(l/Rl). In this instance, with Eo(W’) 
= W,  and W,  uncorrelated with R1,  the expectations of the arguments 
of the log terms in equations (9) are equal. However, the argument of 
the log term in (9-DC) is subject to less uncertainty (as oft = 0) than 
in (9-DB). This is due to both the wage diversification embodied in the 
DC plan and the interest rate risk that appears only in the DB plan. 
Using equations (9), we may obtain the derived utility function at r 
= 0: 
(10)  J(A,,  W,,  t = 0) = max{log(C,)  + EO  [J(Al, WI,  t  =  I)]}. 
From equation (lo), it is easy to show that time-0 utility is higher in 
the DC plan (still assuming that the expectations hypothesis holds). 
Consider the optimizing value of time-0 consumption under the DB 
plan. This consumption choice is also feasible in the DC plan and will 
result in an identical value for Al  . However, for any given A ,, E,[J(A  ,, 
W1,  t  = l)] is greater in the DC plan. This last point follows from the 
equal expected values of the arguments of the log function in equations 
(9), the greater dispersion  of  the argument in  the DB plan, and the 
concavity of the log function. Because DC plans offer greater welfare 
than DB plans at consumption levels that  are optimal for DB plans, 
they must do so afortiori when C, is chosen to be optimal for the DC 
environment. 
For the DB plan to dominate the DC plan, it would be necessary for 
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require that B(0, 2) be less than E,,(l/Z?&,), that is, that there be a 
positive liquidity or risk  premium  for investing in  long-term bonds 
rather than rolling over shorts. 
At this point, it is worth reconsidering the assumptions of our model. 
It should be apparent that the zero expected growth rate of real wages 
is not essential to the argument. Our analysis would have been similar 
even with a positive trend in real wages. The only major modification 
would involve an adjustment for the fact that a DB plan with a  100 
percent replacement rate of final salary would promise retirement-period 
income greater than  career-average wages. The per period  contribu- 
tions to the retirement fund in the equal-present-value DC plan would 
thus need  to be  correspondingly  increased.  In the  nomenclature  of 
equation (2),  the sum of k, and k2 would need to exceed 1  .O.  However, 
aside from this adjustment, the analysis would be similar. 
The issue of interest rate uncertainty during the retirement period is 
more difficult and poses issues not easily treated in the above model. 
In our 3-period model, the individual simply consumes total retirement 
wealth in the last period. If, however, retirement itself is viewed as a 
many-period interval, then real retirement income and not wealth may 
be the significant determinant of welfare. Given a stock of wealth at 
retirement, the real consumption stream that is feasible for the retiree 
depends on the real long-term interest rate at the time of retirement, 
when  the purchase  of  a (real) life annuity is contemplated.  Even if 
retirement  wealth  can  be  predicted  fairly  precisely  with  a  low- 
investment-risk DC retirement fund, the real income stream that can 
be generated by that wealth is subject to considerable uncertainty.6 In 
contrast, by guaranteeing a specified income (and hence, consumption) 
stream upon retirement, the (price-level-indexed) DB plan eliminates 
the risk associated with the conversion, at retirement, of a stock of 
retirement wealth into a flow of equivalent-present-value consumption. 
DC plans cannot offer a guaranteed capitalization rate at retirement 
because of our assumption that life annuities and bonds of long- enough 
maturity do not exist. 
In  order to examine some potential effects  of  uncertainty  in  the 
interest rate at retirement, we will consider a simple adjustment to our 
model. Suppose that at t  = 2, the financial assets of individuals are 
multiplied by  some increasing function of R2,  f(R2),  where R2 equals 
one plus the postretirement rate of interest. The multiplication byf(R2) 
reflects the increased retirement-income stream that is available to DC 
participants when interest rates at retirement turn out to be high. In 
contrast, for DB plans, the retirement-income stream is guaranteed by 
the firm so that interest-rate risk is not borne by plan participants. 
Reconsider now the optimal consumption program for DC plan par- 
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(1  1) 
which now is stochastic at t  =  1 because of  the dependence on RZ. 
Thus, at t  =  1, the maximization problem becomes 
C2  = [(A,  +  Wi  - CI)R,  + f'~clf(Rd7 
max log(C0 + E,tlog(C2)1, 
which has first-order condition 
But examination of equations (11) and (12) shows that AR,) drops 
out of the first-order conditions so that (12) results in exactly the same 
consumption level at t = 1 as in the nonstochastic R2  model. Lifetime 
utility, however, may change. For example, for an actuarially fair AR,) 
adjustment, such as AR, = R2/E,(R2),7  consumption at t  =  1 is un- 
changed, while consumption at t = 2 has the same expected value as 
in the previous model, but greater uncertainty. In this case, expected 
time-2 utility falls. If time-2 interest rate uncertainty is sufficiently great 
relative to wage and time-1 interest rate uncertainty, DC plans could 
become inferior to DB plans from the viewpoint of plan participants. 
Thus, retirement-period interest rate uncertainty emerges as a potential 
advantage of  DB relative to DC plans. 
5.3.3  Factor-Share Uncertainty 
Merton (1983) has examined a model in which labor-income uncer- 
tainty derives entirely from an aggregate production function in which 
income shares accruing to capital and labor are stochastically deter- 
mined. In contrast to the model above, in which labor-income uncer- 
tainty  is diversifiable,  in  Merton's  model  labor  income is perfectly 
correlated across individuals. Given the nontradeability of human cap- 
ital, economic inefficiencies arise in this economy, since early in life, 
individuals hold too much of their wealth in human capital relative to 
physical capital, while at retirement all wealth is invested in physical 
capital. These portfolio imbalances preclude optimal sharing of factor- 
share risk. Merton suggests that a Social Security system which pays 
retirees a share of current wage income implicitly provides diversifi- 
cation across factor shares and can increase welfare by improving the 
efficiency of risk bearing in the economy. 
A similar argument can be made with regard to DB versus DC plans. 
In a DC plan, the income of a retired individual depends solely on 
investment performance and is independent of  retirement-period un- 
certainty in factor shares. Retirees thus have no stake in labor income 
during their retirement period. In a DB plan, retirement income is also 
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primarily attributable to unforeseeable long-term secular trends (rather 
than to transitory business-cycle effects) then a final-salary DB plan 
may provide risk-sharing benefits similar to Merton’s Social Security 
scheme. Such secular uncertainty could arise, for example, from un- 
anticipated changes in labor-augmenting technical progress. 
Since the pension benefit under the DB plan is tied to final salary, 
individuals participating in such a scheme are invested in an implicit 
security  that  is  tied  to the wage  share in  the  neighborhood of  the 
retirement period.  To  the extent that firms offer ad hoc increases in 
pension  benefits when wages of  current employees increase, the re- 
tiree’s stake in aggregate labor income is further enhanced. Of course 
DC plan benefits also depend to some extent on end-of-career earnings. 
However, the career averaging properties of  DC plans greatly reduce 
the magnitude of  this dependence. Thus, if  labor-income uncertainty 
is predominantly dependent on economy-wide factors, then this source 
of risk would favor DB over DC plans. 
5.3.4  Inflation 
In the preceding model, we assumed that wages and pension benefits 
were all contracted in real terms. It is clear that the vast majority of 
DB plans as currently implemented are not contractually indexed dur- 
ing the retirement period. This weakens the case for viewing DB plans 
as offering income-maintenance or interest-rate insurance. 
Moreover, there is controversy surrounding the degree of indexation 
during the worker’s active life. Bulow (1982) has argued that wages in 
firms administering DB plans should not be expected to keep pace with 
the price level. His argument is based on the notion that labor markets 
clear as spot markets (with respect  to pension issues) and that any 
implicit contracts between firms and workers are independent of pen- 
sion issues. In this case, the market-clearing employee compensation 
will determine the sum of  wages plus accruing pension benefits. The 
level  of  either  wages  or  pension  accruals  alone,  however,  is 
indeterminate. 
To  illustrate Bulow’s point, consider the effects of an unanticipated 
increase in the price level. The increase imposes a real loss on workers, 
since their pension benefits are defined in nominal terms. Of  course, 
the worker’s loss is the firm’s gain. If, however, the employees were 
to receive  a pay  raise  in  the  subsequent period  which  would  keep 
their real wage constant, then the earnings base upon which pension 
benefits are calculated also would rise at  the inflation rate, and the 
worker’s pension loss would be eliminated. Real compensation in the 
second period would in  effect be higher than in the first: real wages 
are constant, but  pension  transfers have increased in  order to com- 
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effect, issued insurance against the effect of  inflation on the value of 
pension benefits. 
Bulow argues that firms neither behave in this way nor should they 
be expected to. His competing model holds total real compensation 
exogenous. Because pension benefits in DB plans  increase with the 
wage level, the wage component of compensation will not rise at the 
inflation rate in the subsequent period. Instead, the sum of the partially 
indexed wage increase and partially indexed recovery of real pension 
benefits  together will  provide  an  increase  in  nominal  compensation 
which matches the inflation rate. However, the initial loss of pension 
value due to inflation is borne entirely by the worker. 
Under the Bulow model, DB plans pose significant risk to partici- 
pants. The nominal nature of the pension contract is to be taken quite 
seriously; workers bear the entire brunt of inflation risk. Thus, while 
DB plans provide a less variable final-salary replacement rate to work- 
ers than do DC plans, the final real salary itself becomes more sensitive 
to inflation. Whether DB or DC plans are riskier in a utility sense is 
therefore an open question.  Bulow’s model is far from  universally 
accepted. Several observers (e.g., Cohn and Modigliani 1983) believe 
that firms do in fact offer implicit indexation to workers. In this view, 
the wage decision is made separately from the pension decision, and 
the effects of  wage increases on pension  benefits are ignored in the 
determination of  worker compensation. 
5.4  Concluding Comments: Is There a Better Way? 
The major advantage of DB plans is the potential they offer to provide 
a stable replacement rate of final income to workers. If the replacement 
rate is the relevant variable for worker retirement utility, then DB plans 
offer some degree of insurance against real wage risk. Of course, pro- 
tection  offered to workers is  risk  borne  by  the firm. As real  wages 
change, funding rates must correspondingly  adjust. However, to the 
extent that  real  wage risk  is  largely diversifiable to employers, and 
nondiversifiable to employees, the replacement rate stability should be 
viewed as an advantage of DB plans. 
The advantages of  DC  plans are most  apparent during periods of 
inflation uncertainty. These are: the predictability of the value of pen- 
sion wealth, the ability to invest in inflation-hedged portfolios rather 
than nominal DB annuities, and the fully-funded nature of the DC plan. 
Finally, the DC plan has the advantage that workers can more easily 
determine the true present value of  the pension benefit they earn in 
any year, although they may have more uncertainty about future pen- 
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defined benefits is difficult at best and imposes severe informational 
requirements on workers. Such difficulties could lead workers to mis- 
value their total compensation and result in misinformed behavior.8 
Of interest for future research is the possibility of  pension plan de- 
signs that combine the best attributes of DB and DC plans. Many firms 
already offer DB plans supplemented by DC plans. An interesting al- 
ternative  is  the  so-called floor plan, which is in  essence a DC plan 
together with a guarantee of  a minimum retirement income based on 
a DB-type formula. Employers and employees can trade off the level 
of guaranteed floor against the size of the expected DC benefit. These 
plans offer the downside protection of  DB plans, yet still allow em- 
ployees to take positions in high-expected-return assets. Floor plans 
already are offered by some firms  and allow for a great deal of flex- 
ibility and creativity. 
Notes 
1.  It is important to distinguish here between  several subcategories of DC 
plans: money purchase, profit sharing, and thrift plans. For money purchase 
plans, like TIAA-CREF,  contributions are usually  based  on the employee’s 
compensation, as stated in the text. But in profit-sharing plans employer con- 
tributions are based  on the sponsor’s profitability,  and in thrift plans contri- 
bution levels are usually determined voluntarily by employees, with employer 
matching contributions at some prespecified rate. Thrift plans are usually of- 
fered as a supplement to a DB or other DC plan. 
2.  Until the late 1970s, employee contributions to many DC plans were not 
tax-deductible,  the main exception being employees of certain nonprofit or- 
ganizations  (403[b] plans).  But recently  the government has expanded tax- 
deductibility of employee contributions to the private for-profit sector through 
401(k) plans. 
3.  There is a  separate question  of  whether the difference  in backloading 
patterns is of importance to workers. Consider a scenario in which the inflation 
rate is fixed and only the interest rate varies. In this case, the impact of interest 
rates on accrual patterns would be irrelevant to workers from a welfare stand- 
point. The real stream of benefits to be paid starting at retirement is independent 
of the trajectory of  the present value of accrued benefits. When inflation rates 
are stochastic, however, backloading patterns can have important effects on 
welfare. The real benefit  stream during retirement moves  inversely  with the 
stochastic price level. 
4.  The contribution  pattern for a DC plan required  to match the accrual 
pattern of a DB plan could run into IRS limits on annual contributions at older 
ages, particularly for higher paid employees. 
5.  An  alternative  explanation  is that insurance companies view their an- 
nuitants as members  of a captive market and  try to recoup past losses by 
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6.  As always, it is impossible to tell from first principles of welfare analysis 
whether an individual would necessarily choose to convert wealth into a risk- 
less stream of retirement  benefits. 
7. This is an actuariafly  fair adjustment in the sense that the expected value 
of period-2 income would be unaffected. 
8.  While workers are more likely to be informationally disadvantaged than 
employers, the level of  complication is such that employers also may make 
significant mistakes.  All  of this is perhaps an issue in evaluating the Bulow 
argument, since that argument turns on accurate perceptions of the  “true” 
pension benefits and costs. 
9.  Among the companies offering floor plans are Xerox, Hewlett-Packard, 
and Georgia-Pacific. 
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Comment  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
This paper  provides a very  insightful comparison of defined contri- 
bution and defined benefit pension plans. While the authors are cau- 
tious, one is left with the impression that the defined contribution form 
of pension plans is superior in many, if not all, respects to the defined 
benefit form. I certainly concur with that conclusion. Many defined 
benefit plans appear to subject workers and employers to unnecessary 
earnings risk by tying the pension payment to the average of earnings 
at the end of workers’ careers; while hedging inflation, such provisions 
mean that workers’ pensions are very sensitive to earnings late in their 
careers.  Such earnings may be  unusually  low for reasons including 
poor health, changes in market conditions, and so forth. 
Other defined benefit plans relate the pension to longer averages of 
earnings, which make the initial real pension benefit potentially quite 
sensitive to inflation. Still other defined benefit pensions are indepen- 
dent of earnings, positing a nominal benefit that depends only on ser- 
vice. The real values of these latter pensions are also very sensitive to 
inflation. 
In contrast to the defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans 
appear to be riskier with respect to the real rate of  return. However, 
as the authors point out, one can devise close to riskless portfolios 
that get around this objection. In addition, they make the important 
point that defined benefit plans also are sensitive to the real rate of 
return because changes in real rates alter the present value of future 
defined benefits. 
Once workers retire the defined benefit pensions are subject to con- 
siderable inflation risk.  While many  firms do provide  cost-of-living 
increases on an ad hoc basis, these increases do not keep pace with 
inflation, as Robert Clark has shown in his study of cost-of-living in- 
creases in the 1970s. In contrast, defined contribution plans give work- 
ers the option of  withdrawing their funds and investing them them- 
selves. As mentioned, one can safely hedge inflation and secure a real, 
if minuscule, rate of return; the problem is, however, that many retirees 
may not know how to devise such riskless portfolios that involve using 
future commodity markets. While financial markets could provide such 
safe assets, they do not appear readily available at the current time. 
A problem with defined contribution plans not discussed in detail by 
the authors is that defined contribution plans that pay off at retirement 
do not provide retirees with an annuity, and therefore do not provide 
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retirees with insurance against life-span uncertainty. Those that do pay 
off in the form of an annuity provide a stream of nominal retirement 
benefits that are subject to inflation risk just like the benefits of defined 
benefit plans. 
Another important issue that the authors do not consider is whether 
defined benefit plans are too complicated for workers-and,  indeed, 
even employers-to  understand and properly evaluate. It is not atypical 
to find a defined benefit plan that has (1) an age- and service-related 
benefit formula,  (2) an average earnings base,  (3) age- and service- 
dependent  early retirement reduction  formulas, (4)  special early re- 
tirement supplemental benefits, and (5)  actuarial reductions for workers 
terminating prior to early retirement. To  calculate correctly one’s ac- 
crual of  pension benefits in  such plans requires actuarial skills which 
typical workers do not possess. In addition, in many cases even if the 
workers  possessed  such  skills, the  booklets describing the pension 
plans are so poorly written, if  not intentionally  misleading, that it is 
very difficult to figure out what one is actually receiving.  Hence, an 
important advantage of defined contribution plans is that they provide 
workers with better information about their retirement finances. 
My  guess is that defined benefit plans emerged because they were 
attractive to older union members and to employers who thought they 
could generate strong retirement incentives without being explicit about 
those incentives. In the process the country has been straddled with a 
very risky private pension system that provides insufficient information 
to both workers and employers about the benefits and costs of financing 
retirement. 